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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In this Symposium honoring the scholarly work of Charles Sullivan, 
mentor to many (including me) and prolific and influential legal scholar, I 
seek to advance what some may consider a shockingly bold claim: that 
Charlie is wrong—at least when it comes to his portrayal of the systemic 
theories of discrimination under Title VII, especially systemic disparate 
treatment theory.  Charlie is, however, in good company.  Employment 
discrimination scholars, attorneys, and judges today—in casebooks, articles, 
briefs, and judicial opinions—tend to describe the concepts of disparate 
treatment and disparate impact as wholly distinct, even diametrically 
opposed.1  What’s more, they portray systemic disparate treatment theory as 
 
 Professor of Law, University of San Francisco Law School.  Special thanks to Charlie 
Sullivan for many years of pushing me to clarify my thinking and my writing—and for 
inviting me to be a part of this Symposium honoring his work.  Thank you also to the editors 
of the SETON HALL LAW REVIEW for being gracious hosts and editors.  This Essay benefited 
from comments and feedback of the Symposium participants.   
 1  Charlie’s casebook on employment discrimination law, which he for many years co-
authored with professors Michael J. Zimmer and Rebecca Hanner White, is actually one of 
the few casebooks that presents a somewhat more nuanced account of the line between impact 
and treatment.  See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
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narrowly constrained, stating, for example, that  “intentional discrimination” 
proven by systemic disparate treatment theory requires evidence of a 
particular state of mind on the part of leaders of a company, or that “implicit 
bias” exercised by low-level decision makers within a company cannot 
amount to disparate treatment by the entity for which those decision makers 
are acting.2 
While my overall claim is bold, my immediate goal for this Essay is 
much more modest.  I seek to expose a key turn in employment 
discrimination jurisprudence that may have led us astray.  To do so, I take a 
deep dive into a case that most people think of as plaintiff friendly and 
relatively simple: Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, decided by the 
Supreme Court in 1988.  Watson is well known for its holding that an 
employer’s subjective decision-making practice can be challenged using 
disparate impact theory—and for Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s plurality 
opinion restructuring the doctrine of disparate impact to be substantially 
more defendant friendly, later taken up by the Court in Wards Cove and 
 
DISCRIMINATION 2 (8th ed. 2013) (quoting a passage from Teamsters v. United States, but 
noting that the Teamsters Court’s description is “enigmatic”); see also CHARLES A. SULLIVAN 
& MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 1–2 (9th ed. 
2017) (removing the word “enigmatic” but still mentioning uncertainty in understanding of 
the term “disparate treatment”).  Cf. MARIA L. ONTIVEROS ET AL., EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 96–97 (9th 
ed. 2016) (emphasizing “intent” as the distinguishing line between disparate treatment and 
disparate impact and suggesting that the term “intentional discrimination” is easily and widely 
understood, if not easily proven); JOSEPH A. SEINER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: 
PROCEDURES, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE 80 (2d Ed. 2019) (stating that “there are two 
different types of employment discrimination claims — disparate treatment (or intentional 
discrimination) and disparate impact (or unintentional discrimination)”). 
  For examples of articles in which authors draw a descriptively stark line between 
treatment and impact along a line of subjective “intent,” see Sandra F. Sperino, Justice 
Kennedy’s Big New Idea, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1789, 1790–91 (2016) (describing the line between 
disparate impact and disparate treatment as one of “intent” without further discussion); David 
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 919–20, 923–25 
(2013) (equating disparate treatment with subjective intent and arguing for a negligence 
standard); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1167 (1995) (“Every successful disparate treatment story 
needs a villain.”).  See also Sullivan, infra note 2.  I do not claim that these authors argue in 
favor of subjective intent as the line between treatment and impact; only that they seem to 
assume as much or in some cases to describe the law as stating as much.  For more on judges 
and judicial opinions, see infra Part III. 
 2  Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 949 (2005) (stating that systemic disparate treatment theory “is 
open to the same foundational problem as individual disparate treatment: if ‘intent’ does not 
include cognitive mistakes or extend to characteristics only correlated with the excluded 
groups, the employer may still avoid liability, even in a systemic case, by so persuading the 
factfinder”); see also id. at 970 (“[T]he advantage of the bias-related label [of disparate 
treatment], and even its accuracy, depends on defining ‘bias’ in a nonintuitive way.”).  
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ultimately reversed by Congress in the 1991 Civil Rights Act (CRA).3  What 
commentators have missed is that Watson represents a turning point for 
employment discrimination law from understanding systemic theories of 
discrimination as softly bounded and interwoven to understanding those 
theories as sharply constrained and juxtaposed. 
I argue in this Essay that the problem with Watson lies not in what the 
Court held or said about disparate impact, but in what it said (and did not 
say) about systemic disparate treatment.  The Supreme Court in Watson 
juxtaposed disparate impact against disparate treatment in two ways: first, it 
expressly described disparate treatment so as to considerably narrow the 
scope of systemic disparate treatment theory; and, second, it failed to 
interrogate why the plaintiff in the case had turned to disparate impact in the 
first place, thereby leaving the impression that systemic disparate treatment 
was not an appropriate tool for the plaintiff in a case like Watson.  In doing 
so, the Supreme Court set the stage for mistaken assumptions and ultimately 
for the erosion of civil rights afforded by the Court’s earlier seminal systemic 
disparate treatment decisions, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
Unites States4 and Hazelwood School District v. United States.5 
The Essay is organized in three parts.  In the first, I surface history.  I 
show that advocates in the early days of Title VII put disparate impact 
forward as an overarching concept for employment discrimination law, 
rather than as a precise systemic legal theory.  By this I mean that the goal 
was for the disparate impact concept to permeate all of employment 
discrimination law, including individual claims of discrimination.  This 
history also shows that for years the Court resisted disparate impact as an 
overarching concept, especially efforts to bring disparate impact to bear on 
individual claims of discrimination, but it did so without juxtaposing impact 
against treatment. 
The second part exposes the juxtaposition turn in Watson.  Drawing 
extensively on the briefs and opinions in the case, I show how the Supreme 
Court’s opinion, what is said and also what is not said, can be seen as the 
first step in a substantial conceptual narrowing of systemic disparate 
treatment theory. 
The third part comes back around to consider how and why the 
juxtaposition matters.  I argue that by shifting our thinking about the 
 
 3  Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 649–50 (1989); Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071.  For commentary on Watson at the time it was 
decided, see generally Karen H. Cross, Recent Development, Title VII: Application of Impact 
Analysis to Subjective Employment Criteria—Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S.Ct. 
2777 (1988), 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 264 (1989).  
 4  431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
 5  433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
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concepts of impact and intent, the juxtaposition turn of Watson can lead us 
to narrowly construe disparate treatment theories, to conflate individual and 
systemic theories, and ultimately to reverse well-established and key aspects 
of employment discrimination law. 
II. BEFORE JUXTAPOSITION: TWO OVERLAPPING AND INTERTWINED 
CONCEPTS 
With early Title VII litigation now over forty years behind us, it is easy 
to forget (or, for some, to never have seen at all) that the concepts of disparate 
impact and treatment were at one point not a part of employment 
discrimination law.  The statute itself mentioned neither “impact” nor 
“treatment.”6  It was advocates who took on the terms and began to use them 
to describe how plaintiffs might prove a claim alleging violation of the Act—
and how defendants might defend against those claims.7  In this part, I show 
that the concept of disparate impact as understood by advocates during this 
time was broad and intended to permeate employment discrimination law, 
and I show that the Supreme Court in its key cases developing the law during 
this time may have largely rejected that view but nonetheless did not 
juxtapose impact against intent until Watson. 
A.  Disparate Impact as a Concept across Employment 
Discrimination Law 
In Griggs v. Dukes Power Co., an early Title VII case (decided in 1971), 
the Supreme Court faced the question of whether Title VII of the Civil Rights 
 
 6  After the 1991 Amendments, Title VII does mention “impact” in a provision that 
largely codifies a specific systemic theory for proving discrimination that emerged from 
Griggs v. Duke Power.  42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k) (2018).  The 1964 Act, however, provided no 
mention of the term, instead stating simply that it is an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer: 
(1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, condition, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or 
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a). 
 7  See generally Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972) (on disparate 
impact theory and its development by advocates and courts); ROBERT BELTON, THE CRUSADE 
FOR EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE: THE GRIGGS V. DUKE POWER STORY (2014) (same). 
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Act was limited to subjective intent to discriminate.8  The Court responded 
unanimously with a resounding “no.”9  According to the Court, “[w]hat is 
required . . . is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers 
to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the 
basis of racial or other impermissible classification.”10  The Court further 
explained, “[t]he touchstone is business necessity.  If an employment 
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to 
job performance, the practice is prohibited.”11 
As anyone familiar with employment discrimination law knows, out of 
Griggs a precise doctrine for proving disparate impact discrimination would 
emerge.12  But Griggs was not initially understood to describe a precise 
doctrine.  Rather, the Court there articulated a broad principle that civil rights 
advocates at the time hoped would permeate throughout employment 
discrimination law under Title VII—and beyond.  Early efforts by civil rights 
advocates presented disparate impact as a concept more than a precise legal 
doctrine.13  The idea was to infuse civil rights laws with disparate impact so 
that discrimination was pervasively understood not just as a problem of 
targeted individualized acts of bias or animus, but also of employer or 
decision maker use of practices or reasoning that would freeze in place an 
unequal status quo or that were unjustified as business decisions.  This meant 
that early efforts to use Griggs spanned both what we tend to think of today 
as disparate impact (specifically, systemic disparate impact theory, which 
makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to use a practice 
that has an impact on a protected group and is not justified as job related and 
consistent with business necessity)14 and also disparate treatment, especially 
individual disparate treatment cases and judicial scrutiny of employer-
provided reasons for individual employment decisions. 
The case of McDonnell Douglas v. Green serves as a good example.15  
In that case, Percy Green challenged St. Louis-based aerospace 
manufacturing company McDonnell Douglas’s refusal to rehire him after a 
layoff on the ground that the refusal violated Title VII as a decision made 
 
 8  401 U.S. 424, 428 (1971). 
 9  Id. at 430.  
 10  Id. at 431. 
 11  Id. 
 12  The disparate impact theory doctrine has been substantially codified in Title VII.  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2018).  
 13  See Blumrosen, supra note 7, at 69–74 (describing thinking around the concept of 
disparate impact as it informed the litigation in Griggs); see id., at 84–89 (describing the 
disparate impact “principle” as it might apply to individuals and employers asserting a “best 
qualified” defense). 
 14  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). 
 15  411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
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because of his race.16  Green, a black man and well-known civil rights activist 
(he climbed the St. Louis arch during its construction to protest the lack of 
black workers), was suspected of being involved in an illegal “stall in” and 
“lock in” designed to protest the employment practices of McDonnell 
Douglas as discriminatory.17  McDonnell Douglas pointed to Green’s 
involvement in the protest activities as its reason for refusing to rehire him 
and argued that its decision thereby did not violate Title VII.18  The district 
judge in the case agreed, holding that McDonnell Douglas’s refusal to rehire 
Green was not discriminatory because it was based on Green’s misconduct.19  
The court of appeals, however, relying on the broad concept of Griggs, 
expected McDonnell Douglas to do more than merely point to a non-race-
based reason for its decision; the court expected McDonnell Douglas to 
justify its reason as related to Green’s ability to do the job in question.20  In 
an opinion of the court of appeals (which was later modified), the court 
stated: 
When a black man demonstrates that he possesses the 
qualifications to fill a job opening and that he was denied the job, 
we think he presents a prima facie case of racial discrimination 
and that the burden passes to the employer to demonstrate a 
substantial relationship between the reasons offered for denying 
employment and the requirements of the job.  Here, McDonnell 
Douglas has not demonstrated any testimony or other evidence 
that Green’s participation in the “stall-in” would impede his 
ability to perform the job for which he applied.  There is no 
evidence that Green’s conduct would cause fellow employees or 
supervisors to refuse to cooperate with Green, thereby disrupting 
plant operations.21 
Even after later modification of the opinion to remove the shift in burden, 
there remained language stating that the district court should have considered 
“whether the reasons given by McDonnell Douglas for not rehiring Green 
were related to the requirements of the job.”22  These passages of the court 
of appeals’ opinion reveal an effort to bring the concept of job-related 
justification from disparate impact into individual cases of discrimination, 
where an individual is challenging a single decision as discriminatory.  
Bringing the concept of disparate impact into individual cases would require 
business justification for the defendant’s reasons for the decision. 
 
 16  Id. at 796. 
 17  Id. at 794–96. 
 18  Id. at 796.  
 19  Id. at 797. 
 20  Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 21  Id. at 344. 
 22  Id. at 349 (Johansen, J., dissenting) (pointing this out).  
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In its 1973 decision in the McDonnell Douglas case, the Supreme Court 
rejected this position.  Instead, it adopted a framework for analyzing 
individual disparate treatment cases—cases that ask whether a particular 
employment decision was based on protected group status—that focuses on 
whether the employer has provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for its decision.  If the plaintiff cannot show that the reason proffered was a 
pretext for discrimination, no violation of Title VII will be found.23 
The Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas thereby reserved Griggs 
and the concept of disparate impact to systemic cases in which a plaintiff 
challenges a practice as discriminating against a group rather than 
challenging an individual decision as biased.  Even though the Court firmly 
limited the reach of disparate impact, however, it did not juxtapose disparate 
impact against disparate treatment.  Instead, it merely stated that an 
individual challenge to a specific decision is not governed or influenced by 
Griggs and the concept of disparate impact.24 
Furnco Construction v. Waters,25 decided several years after 
McDonnell Douglas, might be seen as involving a similar attempt by judges 
to draw the concept of disparate impact into individual disparate treatment 
cases.  Furnco Construction specialized in re-lining blast furnaces in steel 
mills, and it was sued by black bricklayers who applied for bricklayer 
positions by showing up to the job site (“at the gate”) and seeking 
employment from the superintendent on the job.26  The employer claimed 
that these workers were rejected because the superintendent, who was 
charged by Furnco with hiring the most qualified workers, had a policy of 
not hiring workers at the gate and because the names of the black workers 
involved were not included on a list drawn up by the superintendent.27 
The panel for the court of appeals questioned the employer’s claim that 
hiring from a list rather than at the gate was a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason under McDonnell Douglas.  According to the court, the reason could 
 
 23  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973).  Despite its 
rejection of the plaintiffs’ and court of appeals’ effort to draw on the concept of disparate 
impact, the Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas is nonetheless understood as relatively 
plaintiff friendly in that the framework that the Court established allows individuals to prove 
disparate treatment discrimination by inference, from falsity of the defendant’s proffered 
reason, without any direct evidence of bias, such as biased statements of the decision maker.   
 24  Id. at 803 n.14 (“We note that the issue of what may properly be used to test 
qualifications for employment is not present in this case.  Where employers have instituted 
employment tests and qualifications with an exclusionary effect on minority applicants, such 
requirements must be ‘shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance 
of the jobs’ for which they were used.” (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
431 (1971))).  
 25  438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
 26  Id. at 567. 
 27  Id. 
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not be legitimate and nondiscriminatory because it was not adequately 
designed to capture black as well as white applicants—again, the concept of 
disparate impact, although in slightly different form.  The court expected the 
employer to make a connection between the reason given and ability to do 
the job in question and to make a showing that it had used the method of 
hiring that would yield the highest number of black hires.28  The Supreme 
Court again rejected this approach.29  The Court saw the case as best framed 
as several individual claims, and, like in McDonnell Douglas, it noted that 
disparate impact from Griggs would not apply because the case did not 
involve a test or practice that, applied broadly, was alleged to have a 
disparate impact on a group.30  And the Court corrected the court of appeals’ 
reasoning on the individual claims, stating that “Title VII prohibits [an 
employer] from having as a goal a work force selected by any proscribed 
discriminatory practice, but it does not impose a duty to adopt a hiring 
procedure that maximizes hiring of minority employees.”31   
Even as the Supreme Court closed the disparate impact concept out of 
individual disparate treatment claims, however, it did not in either of these 
cases juxtapose disparate impact against disparate treatment by contrasting 
the theories or drawing a bright line between them.  In each case, the 
distinction the Court made was an individual versus systemic distinction, and 
even the justices who dissented in part in Furnco, Justice Marshall and 
 
 28  The court of appeals in the case stated the following:  
It seems to us that there is a reasonable middle ground between immediate 
hiring decisions on the spot and seeking out employees from among those 
known to the superintendent.  A written application could be taken, with 
inquiry as to qualifications and experience.  The applicant’s claims could be 
checked and evaluated, and compared with the qualifications and experience 
of those on the list.  The district court seems to have given no consideration to 
the feasibility of such a method, and we perceive nothing in the record to show 
that it would not be feasible.  The method used, relying on recollections of the 
brick superintendent and recommendations he accepted from others, was by 
its nature haphazard, arbitrary, and subjective.  “Such unstandardized and 
subjective procedures lend themselves to arbitrary and discriminatory hiring.”  
Waters v. Furnco Constr. Co., 551 F.2d 1085, 1088–89 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Reed v. 
Arlington Hotel Company, Inc., 476 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 1973)). 
 29  Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576–77 (1978).  
 30  See id. at 575 n.7 (“This case did not involve employment tests, which we dealt with 
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, or particularized 
requirements such as the height and weight specifications considered in Dothard v. 
Rawlinson . . . .”).  (internal citations omitted).  The Court also explained that the case “was 
not a ‘pattern or practice’ case like Teamsters v. United States.”  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  The employer in the case had pushed for application of systemic disparate impact 
theory because it wanted to argue that its other efforts at hiring minority bricklayers should 
operate as a defense to the plaintiffs’ individual claims.  This argument was rejected by the 
Court in a later case, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), but was still open at the time.  
 31  Id. at 577–78. 
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Justice Brennan, agreed.32  They dissented because they thought the majority 
erroneously foreclosed the plaintiffs from asserting a systemic disparate 
impact claim on remand.33 
B.  Two Theories Sharing Goals 
By the time of Watson, the effort to infuse all of employment 
discrimination law with the concept of disparate impact was largely lost, but 
disparate impact nonetheless was not yet firmly juxtaposed against disparate 
treatment.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis in 1976 is 
often seen as a key decision driving a hard distinction between disparate 
treatment and disparate impact.34  We know after Washington v. Davis that 
“intent” is the talisman of constitutional violation, after all.35  But even 
Washington v. Davis left room for capacious understanding of systemic 
disparate treatment, that is, proving systemic disparate treatment by evidence 
of difference in treatment without evidence of a particular state of mind on 
the part of an identified decision maker or leader.  The majority emphasized 
that evidence of impact can be relevant, indeed important evidence in 
inferring a pattern of discrimination by an employer.36 
Shortly after Washington v. Davis came Teamsters and Hazelwood, two 
key systemic discrimination cases brought under Title VII.  Teamsters 
involved a claim by black and Hispanic truck drivers that they had been 
denied long-haul truck driving opportunities because of their race and 
national origin.37  Hazelwood involved a claim by black teachers that they 
had been denied teaching positions in the Hazelwood School District, a 
suburban district outside of St. Louis, because of their race.38  Both cases 
were built in part on statistics comparing the percentage of those from the 
group in the relevant labor pool for the position and the percentage of those 
from the group hired into the position in question, together with other 
evidence that race could explain the stark disparity.39 
 
 32  Id. at 582–84 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 33  Id. at 583–84. 
 34  426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 35  Id. at 238–243 (rejecting the Title VII disparate impact theory for constitutional 
claims).  
 36  Id. at 242 (“Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred 
from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more 
heavily on one race than another.”).  In concurrence, Justice Stevens expressly noted that “the 
line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and 
perhaps not as critical, as the reader of the Court’s opinion might assume.”  Id. at 254 (Stevens, 
J., concurring).  
 37  Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 328–29 (1977).  
 38  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 301 (1977). 
 39  Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 337–38 (describing statistical evidence); Hazelwood, 433 U.S. 
at 303.  See generally Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences Under 
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Teamsters and Hazelwood were heard and decided by the Supreme 
Court in the same year, 1977.  The same justice, Justice Potter Stewart, wrote 
the majority opinions in both cases, and Stewart treated both cases firmly as 
disparate treatment cases.40  As for the holding, understanding that evidence 
of biased statements by high-level (or even low-level) decision makers 
would be difficult to obtain, the Court allowed proof of discrimination by 
inference, like it had done in McDonnell Douglas.41  It also made clear that 
the same or similar evidence might make out both a systemic disparate 
treatment and a disparate impact claim.42 
Moreover, the Court specifically held that statistics alone are enough to 
prove systemic discrimination; no specific instances need be presented.43  
This holding, in fact, was in response to arguments being made in the lower 
courts at the time.  Some lower courts prior to Teamsters and Hazelwood, 
worried about plaintiffs’ reliance on statistics to prove discrimination, had 
adopted a “specific incident” requirement for systemic disparate treatment 
cases.44  The plaintiffs in United Brotherhood Carpenters and Joiners, for 
 
Title VII, 59 VA. L. REV. 463 (1973) (describing early use of statistics in employment 
discrimination cases).  
 40  Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339–41 n.20; Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 n.12.  Around this 
time, a constitutional question was percolating in the courts: the question of whether Title 
VII’s disparate impact concept of discrimination was a valid exercise of congressional power 
authorized by the Constitution.  This question was directly presented to the Court in 
Hazelwood, see 433 U.S. at 306 n.12 (describing the questions presented), and Justice Stewart 
specifically questioned the government’s lawyers at oral argument on whether the district 
court had found intentional discrimination from the evidence presented.  See id. (oral 
argument transcript).  Placing the case firmly as one of disparate treatment allowed the Court 
to avoid the constitutional issue raised by the defendant.  
 41  Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 338, 341; Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 306. 
 42  Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336–37 n.15.  Justice Stewart’s discussion of disparate 
treatment and disparate impact in footnote 15 of the Teamsters opinion is often quoted to 
portray a stark distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact, one that confines 
disparate treatment to purpose.  See supra note 1 (citing casebook authors relying on 
Teamsters in this way).  Justice Stewart is careful to point out in that footnote, however, that 
motive can be inferred “from the mere fact of differences in treatment[.]”  Id. at 336 n.15.  He 
also noted that “[e]ither theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of facts.”  Id.  In 
addition to citing to Griggs, Stewart cited to a 1972 law review article by Alfred Blumrosen 
discussing the concepts of disparate treatment and disparate impact.  Id.; see generally 
Blumrosen, supra note 7, at 68–69 (describing unequal treatment as a violation of Title VII), 
and at 69–71 (describing the advocate push for a disparate impact concept that would capture 
discrimination more widely than the traditional purpose or treatment definitions). 
 43  Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339; Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307–08.  
 44  See, e.g., Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 508 (E.D. Va. 1968) (“But 
the plaintiffs have not shown any instance of a qualified Negro being denied employment or 
promotion to a supervisory position.”); see generally Note, Employment Discrimination: 
Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII, supra note 39, at 472–73, n.38 (citing to lower 
court cases in which the judge imposed a “specific act requirement” and describing the 
requirement as inconsistent with Griggs); see also Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387, 392–93 (1974) (noting the “specific 
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example, sought to show a pattern of discrimination against blacks, and to 
do this they presented statistics showing a dearth of black members of the 
carpenters’ union in a geographic area with a significant black population.45  
The district court judge in the case found no discrimination, reasoning that 
the small number of black members in the carpenters’ union “might readily 
be attributed to a lack of diligent efforts on the part of the blacks to 
effectively pursue their attempts to become union members.”46  The judge 
also found that nepotism was “not racially oriented” and that, in regard to the 
hiring halls, “[t]here was not one scintilla of evidence presented to show that 
this particular procedure resulted in any racial discrimination.”47  By this the 
judge meant that no “specific incident” of discrimination had been presented. 
This specific incident requirement was rejected by several appellate 
courts prior to Teamsters and Hazelwood.  As one scholarly note at the time 
described, “The emphasis on specific incidents of discrimination has tended 
to incorporate an unwarranted requirement of invidiousness into the Act’s 
definition of discrimination.”48  The Supreme Court also expressly rejected 
the specific incident requirement in Teamsters and Hazelwood.  Statistics 
alone are enough, held the Court, to make out a prima facie case of a pattern 
or practice of discrimination, a systemic disparate treatment claim.49 
III. WATSON AND THE JUXTAPOSITION TURN 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank did more 
than reject disparate impact as an overarching concept (even as it allowed 
plaintiffs to use it to challenge subjective decision-making practices); it 
positioned disparate treatment as a narrowly-confined conscious animus 
theory that stands in stark contrast to disparate impact.  The Court did this 
not by its holding, but by the way it construed the concept behind the theories 
of impact and treatment and by the way it treated Watson’s disparate 
treatment claims brought in the courts below. 
 
act requirement” in the lower courts and stating that the trend toward such a requirement was 
“waning”).  
 45  United States v. United Broth. & Carpenters of Am., 457 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1972) 
(explaining that plaintiffs regularly start with statistics to prove a pattern of discrimination: 
“[o]n the basis that a showing of an absence or a small black union membership in a 
demographic area containing a substantial number of black workers raises an inference that 
the racial imbalance is the result of discrimination, the burden of going forward and the burden 
of persuasion is shifted to the accused, for such a showing is enough to establish a prima 
facie case”). 
 46  Id. at 215. 
 47  Id. 
 48  See Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII, 
supra note 39, at 473. 
 49  See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
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A.  The Case 
Clara Watson, the lead plaintiff in the Watson case, filed suit against 
Forth Worth Bank & Trust in 1981, alleging that the bank discriminated 
against her and other similarly situated persons on the basis of race in 
violation of Title VII.50  Watson had applied several times for a teller position 
at the bank before she was hired in 1973 as a proof operator, not a teller.51  
She and the other four black employees of the bank at the time worked in the 
back room and had no contact with the public.  Watson was later promoted 
to a teller position in the motor bank,52 and then in 1980 she was transferred 
to the bank’s main lobby.  Between 1980 and 1981, Watson applied for four 
different promotions into supervisory positions and was turned down each 
time, and each time a white man or woman was promoted or hired instead.53 
Watson filed suit seeking certification of a class consisting of black 
employees and applicants at the bank, and the trial judge initially certified 
the class.54  Watson presented evidence at trial that included statistical 
evidence regarding hiring over a period of four years and evidence that black 
employees were evaluated more severely than white employees, were paid 
 
 50  Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 1986).  
 51  Id. at 793. 
 52  Id.  When Watson initially inquired of Gary Shipp, a white man and the vice president 
in charge of personnel at the time, about a teller position, he told her that tellers have to handle 
too much money “for blacks.”  See Brief for Petitioner at n.5, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 
Trust, 487 U.S 977 (1988) (No. 86-6139) (relaying Watson’s testimony that when she asked 
about a teller position, “Gary Shipp, bank vice-president for personnel, replied, ‘I don’t know 
girl, it’s a big responsibility,’ and ‘It’s a lot of money, you know, for blacks to have to 
count’”).  See also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (stating 
that “petitioner was apparently told at one point that the teller position was a big responsibility 
with ‘a lot of money . . .  for blacks to have to count’”).   
 53  When Watson applied for promotion to the position of supervisor of tellers, Gary 
Shipp chose Richard Burt, a white man who was then supervisor in the bookkeeping 
department.  See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at *4–5, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (No. 86-6139) 
[hereinafter Brief of ACLU] (describing facts).  Burt had been at the bank six years fewer 
than Watson, but the bank pointed to Burt’s year of supervisory experience as the reason for 
the decision.  Id.  When Watson applied for promotion to the position of motor bank teller 
supervisor, Burt, now supervisor of all tellers, chose a white woman, Pat Cullar.  Id. at *5.  
Watson had four years more experience than Cullar at the bank, but Cullar had seventeen 
years of experience at another bank.  Neither had supervisory experience.  Id. at *6.  When 
Watson applied again for the position of supervisor of tellers (after Burt had been promoted 
to a higher supervisory position), the new supervisor again chose Cullar for the position.  Id.  
When Cullar’s position of motor bank supervisor became vacant upon her promotion, Watson 
applied for that position.  Id.  She and another black woman and a white man, Kevin Brown, 
applied for the position.  Id.  Brown had been working at the bank for one year, but the bank 
pointed to his supervisory experience at Six Flags Amusement Park as the reason for the 
decision to promote him rather than Watson.  Id. at *6–7.  
 54  Watson, 487 U.S at 983.  
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less, and advanced more slowly in responsibilities and promotions.55 
After the evidence was presented at trial, the judge decertified the class 
on the ground that a single person did not make both the applicant and the 
employee decisions, and then the judge refused to certify a class of 
employees on the ground that there were too few black employees working 
at the bank to warrant class treatment.56  This was the end of Watson’s 
systemic disparate treatment claim involving employees at the trial level.  
The judge ended up finding no systemic discrimination against the applicant 
class.57  For the individual claim involving Watson and her treatment as an 
employee, the judge applied McDonnell Douglas and found that Watson had 
not proven pretext as to any of the four promotion decisions that she sought.58 
The appellate court, in a 2-1 panel decision, upheld the district court 
judge’s decisions.59  The appellate court held that the district court judge did 
not abuse his discretion in decertifying the class.60  As for Watson’s 
individual claim, the court held that the proper analysis was the McDonnell 
Douglas disparate treatment analysis, and it went on to uphold the district 
judge’s factual findings regarding pretext under a clearly erroneous 
standard.61 
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the question posed 
 
 55  See Watson, 798 F.2d at 810–14 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (describing plaintiffs’ 
evidence).  
 56  Id. at 796.  
 57  The district court judge’s reasoning was as follows:  
After considering the statistical evidence introduced by plaintiffs regarding the 
hiring of blacks by the defendant, the Court find that they do not present a 
prima facie case of race discrimination.  Blacks represent 13.1% of defendant’s 
non-exempt employees and 11.8% of the population in Tarrant County, 10.2 
% of the population of the Fort Worth Metropolitan area and 22.8% of the 
population of Fort Worth.  Accordingly, the Court finds that no discrimination 
against blacks as a class has been proved on the basis of defendant’s hiring 
practices. 
Id. at 811 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (quoting the district court’s opinion).  For explanation of 
why this reasoning is problematic, see id. at 811–13.  
 58  Id. at 798. 
 59  Id.  at 799.  
 60  Id. at 796.  Instead of relying on the district court judge’s reasoning regarding 
commonality, however, asking whether a single person made all personnel decisions at the 
bank, the court of appeals pointed to Watson’s statistical evidence as reason to believe that 
Watson’s promotion claim was not typical of the applicant claims.  Id.  “The applicant class 
claims relied primarily on applicant flow statistics,” said the court.  Id.  “In contrast, the proof 
asserted in support of the promotions claims focused on statistical evidence of the Bank’s 
treatment of black individuals in the employee evaluation process, promotions process, 
compensation process and other employment practices.”  Id.  As the dissenting judge in the 
court of appeals pointed out, this reasoning makes no sense.  Id. at 806 (Goldberg, J., 
dissenting).  
 61  Watson, 798 F.2d at 797–99.  The court upheld the district court’s findings despite 
inconsistency in the bank’s reasons provided for the decisions.  Id. at 799. 
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was whether Watson should have been allowed to challenge the subjective 
decision-making system at the bank (under which each of her promotion 
decisions were made) using disparate impact theory.62  This question masked 
an underlying struggle about disparate treatment, specifically the desire on 
the part of defendants for courts to require evidence of specific instances in 
systemic disparate treatment cases (a position rejected by the Supreme Court 
in Teamsters and Hazelwood, as discussed above, but nonetheless still 
surfacing in lower court decisions in new ways) and at the same time to turn 
cases involving evidence of specific instances into individual disparate 
treatment cases where the focus is often on intent with respect to specific 
decision makers rather than on the practice of the entity as a whole.63  The 
defendant’s position in Watson was that once an employer considered an 
applicant’s individual qualifications, the case became one of individual 
disparate treatment to be analyzed solely under McDonnell Douglas.64 
B.  The Juxtaposition Turn 
At first glance, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Watson (written for a 
unanimous court) was a big plaintiff-side win: disparate impact theory can 
be used to challenge a subjective decision-making system like the one used 
by Fort Worth Bank & Trust.65  From there, Justice O’Connor in her plurality 
opinion went on to cut back the law of disparate impact significantly, a 
position later taken by a majority of the Court in Wards Cove66 and 
overturned in part by Congress in the 1991 CRA.67  But it is the first portion 
of the opinion (for a majority of the Court) that I am concerned with in this 
Essay:  disparate impact theory can be used to challenge subjective decision 
making.  Between the lines of this portion of the opinion, in both what she 
said and what she did not say, O’Connor set disparate impact against 
 
 62  See Brief for Petitioner at *i, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S 977 (1988) 
(No. 86-6139) (stating the question presented as: “Whether an employer’s practice of 
committing employment decisions to the wholly subjective discretion of its supervisors which 
adversely affects minority employees may be tested under the disparate impact theory of proof 
of employment discrimination recognized by this Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424 (1971)”). 
 63  See Brief for Respondent at *6, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S 977 
(1988) (No. 86-6139) (“When the employment practices challenged are subjective, the basis 
of the complaint is that the subjective criteria have been applied in a discriminatory fashion.”); 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, Transcript of Oral Argument (defendant arguing that 
“key to the distinction between McDonnell Douglas and Griggs is that, on the one hand, you 
have these objective artificial rules which disqualify large groups of people, regardless of 
consideration of their individual qualifications, where, with McDonnell Douglas, you have a 
consideration of qualifications”).   
 64  See supra note 63. 
 65  Watson, 487 U.S at 991.  
 66  Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 67  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074. 
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systemic disparate treatment so as to shift our rhetoric and our thinking about 
those theories. 
First, what Justice O’Connor said.  O’Connor narrowed disparate 
treatment by suggesting that stereotyping stands outside of the concept, as if 
a case is either disparate impact or disparate treatment and the reason 
plaintiffs need disparate impact for subjective decision-making practices in 
a case like Watson’s is because stereotyping does not fall within disparate 
treatment.68  Specifically, O’Connor mentioned that a supervisor’s decision 
based on the belief that being a bank teller involved “a lot of money for 
blacks to count” would not be captured by any disparate treatment theory 
and therefore would evade legal redress without availability of the disparate 
impact theory.69 
This suggestion is inconsistent with Teamsters and Hazelwood, where 
the Court clearly stated that difference in treatment, frequently evidenced by 
statistics rather than specific instances, is sufficient to prove a pattern or 
practice of discrimination on the part of an entity.70  If statistics are sufficient, 
it matters not whether stereotyping (either conscious or unconscious) or 
purposeful animus motivated the individualized employment decisions. 
The same is true for individual disparate treatment.  Nothing in the 
Court’s individual disparate treatment decisions requires that stereotyping be 
consciously exercised in order to violate Title VII.  The Court has held that 
a plaintiff can prove individual disparate treatment by inference—for 
example, by comparing the plaintiff’s qualifications to those of someone 
who was given the sought-after promotion—and has held that Title VII 
prohibits all discrimination, “subtle or otherwise.”71  So long as an 
 
 68  Watson, 487 U.S. at 990. 
 69  In full, Justice O’Connor stated: 
It is true, to be sure, that an employer’s policy of leaving promotion decisions 
to the unchecked discretion of lower level supervisors should itself raise no 
inference of discriminatory conduct.  Especially in relatively small businesses 
like respondent’s, it may be customary and quite reasonable simply to delegate 
employment decisions to those employees who are most familiar with the job 
to be filled and with the candidates for those jobs.  It does not follow, however, 
that the particular supervisors to whom this discretion is delegated always act 
without discriminatory intent.  Furthermore, even if one assumed that any such 
discrimination can be adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis, 
the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain.  In this 
case, for example, petitioner was apparently told at one point that the teller 
position was a big responsibility with “a lot of money . . . for blacks to have to 
count.”  Such remarks may not prove discriminatory intent, but they do suggest 
a lingering form of the problem that Title VII was enacted to combat.   
Id. at 990–91.  The petitioner’s brief set this reasoning up.  See Brief for Petitioner at 76–77, 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (No. 86-6139).   
 70  See supra note 41–48 and accompanying text.  
 71  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 272 (1989) (quoting McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).  
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employment decision is taken “because of race” it violates the Act.72 
Rather than suggesting a narrow scope for disparate treatment, 
O’Connor could have as easily explained that it makes sense to allow 
disparate impact challenges to subjective decision-making systems because 
those can be practices that serve as built-in headwinds that must be altered 
or removed unless justified.  We can have a law that allows a plaintiff to 
recover for specific decisions that are based on racial bias and that allows the 
same plaintiff to recover for being subjected to a practice that applied to all 
has a disparate impact on members of her group.  The remedies may be 
different under the two claims, but the law can easily allow both. 
Also significant is what the majority and Justice O’Connor did not say 
in the Watson opinion.  Recall that Watson had alleged systemic disparate 
treatment in the trial court.73  Judge Goldberg in a strong dissent at the 
appellate level (as well as the amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court 
by the NAACP74 and ACLU75) claimed that Watson had presented a 
systemic disparate treatment, pattern or practice case on which she could 
prevail.76  Goldberg explained: 
The not particularly voluminous record in this case does not 
disclose any substantial anecdotal evidence of racial animus [no 
“specific incidents” in other words] . . . .  The numbers, however, 
belie the bank’s claim that it has not discriminated against the 
class on the basis of race.  When Watson began her career at the 
bank as a proof operator in August 1973, the bank employed four 
other blacks in its fifty member work force.  Two printed checks 
in the basement, one was a kitchen attendant, and the last was a 
porter.  The bank has never had a black director or officer, nor has 
it ever had a black supervisor.  Watson’s unrebutted statistics 
 
 72   Scholars continue to debate whether “unconscious bias” should be actionable in 
employment discrimination law, see, e.g., Patrick Shin, Liability for Unconscious 
Discrimination? A Thought Experiment in the Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 
HASTINGS L.J. 67 (2010); Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1000–01, despite relatively broad 
consensus that causation rather than state of mind is the appropriate inquiry, see, e.g., Noah 
Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the 
Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1374 (2009) (stating as 
much); Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV. 979, 
984–85 (2008) (agreeing).  For discussion of the cognitive bias revolution and its possible 
influence in the rise of organizational innocence, a perception that discrimination is solely an 
individual problem and not an organizational one, see TRISTIN K. GREEN, DISCRIMINATION 
LAUNDERING: THE RISE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS IN EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY LAW 32–35 (2017).  
 73  See supra note 54–59 and accompanying text.  
 74  See Brief for NAACP Legal Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (No. 86-6139). 
 75  See Brief of ACLU, supra note 53, at 48–49.  
 76  Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 800 (5th Cir. 1986) (Goldberg, J., 
dissenting).  
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indicate that a black who applies for a job at the bank has one-
fourth the chance of a white applicant to get the job; should the 
black be hired, her performance is apt to be evaluated thirty points 
lower and she is apt to be paid $46.00 per month less than an 
identically qualified white; and the Bank is likely to advance her 
to greater responsibilities at a rate of six-tenths of a pay grade per 
year more slowly than the equally qualified white.  Watson herself 
unsuccessfully sought promotion on four occasions to supervisory 
positions.77 
The Supreme Court ignored these arguments entirely in its opinion, leaving 
readers thinking that Watson did not have a systemic disparate treatment 
claim, while under Teamsters and Hazelwood she clearly did.  Here, too, lies 
the juxtaposition turn: the reasoning goes that without systemic disparate 
treatment at Watson’s disposal, her claim must be open to disparate impact 
analysis, when in reality she could have had both. 
IV. WHY THE JUXTAPOSITION TURN IN WATSON MATTERS 
Why does the juxtaposition turn in Watson matter?  We see casebooks, 
articles, briefs, and judicial opinions entertaining this juxtaposition without 
giving it a second thought.78  Yet it matters because thinking about disparate 
impact and disparate treatment in this way sets us on a path that is 
inconsistent with the case law prior to Watson and that is devastating to 
systemic disparate treatment theory.  It leads to assumptions and arguments 
that systemic disparate treatment requires proof of high-level, subjective 
intent, even purpose,79 and to conflation of individual and systemic disparate 
treatment law.80  While individual claims of discrimination often focus on 
specific decision makers and the reasons for their decisions, systemic 
disparate treatment claims, rightly so, focus on patterns and practices of 
discrimination at the entity level.  Conflating the two merely compounds 
misunderstandings around intent and undermines the Court-approved use of 
statistics to prove discrimination. 
Charlie, for example, in his article, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the 
Desert Palace Mirage, claims that understanding systemic disparate 
treatment to address “decreased opportunity for disfavored groups 
 
 77  Id. at 808. 
 78  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 79  It also leads to claims that cognitive bias is somehow not meant to be captured by 
systemic disparate treatment theory, as mentioned above.  See supra note 2 and accompanying 
text. 
 80  See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 938–39.  For an example of why we should be concerned 
with conflation of individual and systemic disparate treatment, see Tristin K. Green, On 
Macaws and Employer Liability: A Response to Professor Zatz, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 
107, 113 (2009) (pointing out the trouble with Zatz’s conflation of individual and systemic 
disparate treatment).  
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without . . . a single, identifiable discriminatory decision . . . cuts directly 
against the grain of the circuits that are increasingly using the notion of 
‘adverse employment action’ to declare many employment-related decisions 
beyond the reach of Title VII and the other antidiscrimination statutes.”81  By 
conflating systemic and individual theories of discrimination, Charlie misses 
that an adverse-employment-action requirement in individual disparate 
treatment law need not carry over in the same way to systemic disparate 
treatment law.  Indeed, the statistical showings in a systemic disparate 
treatment case indicate that adverse employment actions have occurred, 
resulting in difference in pay or promotion (otherwise, the numerical 
disparities would not emerge).  If we impose the adverse employment action 
requirement as Charlie seems to see it, we would be imposing a specific 
instance requirement, a requirement that was firmly rejected by the Court in 
Teamsters and Hazelwood, as discussed above. 
The Supreme Court more recently made a similar mistake in its 
decision in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes.82  There, the defendant once again 
pressed arguments that sought to divorce individual decisions by individual 
supervisors from the entity and its practices.83  Although the judicial decision 
in the case is one of class certification rather than substantive law, the Court 
suggests that it would be inclined to impose a numerical threshold for 
specific incidents before such incidents could buttress plaintiffs’ statistical 
evidence in a systemic disparate treatment case.84  This is contrary to 
Teamsters and Hazelwood, where statistics alone were held to be enough to 
prove systemic disparate treatment.85 
If we give Watson’s juxtaposition weight—if we take it into our 
thinking about discrimination and ultimately into our doctrine—we will 
begin to accept that systemic disparate treatment is somehow naturally 
cabined and narrow, when Teamsters and Hazelwood tell us that it is not.  At 
bottom, if we are blind to the crux of this move, we cannot effectively fight 
for a comprehensive law that protects against discrimination and incentivizes 
meaningful employer reform. 
 
 81  Sullivan, supra note 2, at 949 (quoting Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace 
Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 91, 92 (2003)). 
 82  564 U.S. 338 (2011).  
 83  Reply Brief for Petitioner at 18, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (No. 
10-277) (stating that “plaintiffs in a Title VII class action bear the burden of showing both 
individual instances of actionable discrimination and a company-wide pattern or practice of 
discrimination”). 
 84  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 358.  See supra note 41–48 and accompanying text.  
 85  See generally GREEN, supra note 72 (describing the push toward individualizing 
discrimination and systemic disparate treatment claims).  
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V. CONCLUSION 
As I said at the outset, I see this Essay as a descriptive project with a 
modest, immediate objective.  I aim to tell the missing story of Watson—its 
place in history and its possible (but not yet fully determined) significance 
for the future.  But my end goal is, of course, much bigger than that.  I want 
to challenge Charlie (and many others) to re-think not just their 
characterization of Watson, but their conception of systemic disparate 
treatment theory.  Watson and its juxtaposition of impact against treatment 
should not be allowed to trump established case law or to erode a 
longstanding theory that is essential for combating systemic discrimination. 
Surely I have not in this short essay put to rest all questions about the 
precise scope of systemic disparate treatment theory—Charlie and I and 
others will no doubt continue our vigorous debates on that front—but I do 
hope that I have advanced us to a new level of conversation about what 
employment discrimination law does and should look like.  That is just one 
of the many things that Charlie and his work have taught me to try to do.  I 
owe thanks to him for so much more, but especially for his open respect—
even solicitation of—difficult conversations and differing views. 
 
